



The Effects of the Israel-Hamas War on Young Adults in Israel

Survey Findings

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Abstract

Background

There are more than two million young adults aged 18-34 in Israel. Hundreds of thousands of these young adults were called up for reserve duty with the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War, and many others are currently in compulsory military service. Young adults were impacted more than any other age group by the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and during the ensuing months of the war. Tens of thousands were themselves exposed to the attack and the war, and many more have family members and friends who were murdered, killed, injured, kidnapped, evacuated from their homes, or otherwise affected. Young adults are currently dealing not only with exposure to the traumatic events and their impact on their mental health, but also with upheavals in other areas such as education and employment that have disrupted their daily routines. All of this is occurring during a life stage that is characterized by a lack of stability, by the need to make many decisions and by challenges arising from the transition to independent living and personal responsibility.

Although young adults are found on all fronts during this war, they have received little recognition as a distinct and vulnerable group. Representatives of the Youth Authority in the Ministry of the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience asked the Children, Youth, and Young Adults Team at the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute to conduct a survey among young adults in order to learn about the war's impact on them.

Objectives

The survey aimed to examine the impact of the Israel-Hamas War on young adults aged 18-34 in Israel in various aspects of their lives, such as education, employment, housing, economic situation, and health. The survey also aimed to identify subpopulations that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of the war. This information can serve as the basis for developing policies and programs for young adults, with the goal of helping them to overcome the long-term effects of the war and to develop their resilience.

Method

An online self-reported survey was conducted from January 23 to February 8, 2024, approximately three and a half months after the outbreak of the war. The survey was carried out among a representative sample of 701 young adults from the entire Jewish and Arab population in Israel. Data collection was carried out by a panel survey company.

Main Findings

The research findings point to the adverse impact of the war on young adults: 23% of young adults planned to start studying in 2023 but cancelled their plans due to the war; 28% had to leave their jobs for various reasons (furlough, business closure, inability to reach the workplace due to the security situation, reserve duty and layoffs); 53% reported that their ability to meet financial obligations had been somewhat or significantly affected; 50% reported a deterioration in their mental health due to the war; 64% reported a decline in their trust in the government; 25% reported being directly affected by the terror attacks or the war (were injured, were evacuated from their homes, their home or property was destroyed, they or their partner was drafted, they were in one of the communities infiltrated by terrorists or at one of the parties in the area); and 32% reported that a family member, close friend, or acquaintance had been harmed. On the other hand, the data also point to the resilience of young adults: 65% are optimistic (believe that their lives will be better in the future), 91% have at least one person to turn to in times of crisis and distress, and 61% have engaged in some form of volunteer activity or donated money to social organizations or private individuals (excluding family and friends) since the outbreak of the war.

A multivariate analysis examining the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and resilience for two dependent variables—deterioration in mental health and economic impact (the reduced ability to meet financial obligations)—revealed differences in vulnerability to the effects of the war across subpopulations. Women, Arabs, young adults in non-marital relationships, and young adults with disability were found to be at risk of mental distress. The subpopulations found to be at risk of economic distress include Arabs, parents of children, young adults living in the periphery, and young adults with below-average income.

Recommendations

Young adults are a key part of the future of society and constitute the engine of its economic growth. Over the past four years, they have faced two major crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and the Israel-Hamas War. For the past several months, they have borne the burden of defending the country out of a sense of mission, exhibiting impressive resilience. However, the accumulated impact of the events trends to erode it.

The research findings point to the need for a comprehensive response that is focused on the needs of young adults and that will help them return to their life trajectories (programs in education, employment, housing, mental health, etc.). To this end, a dedicated budget is needed in order to provide assistance that will improve the condition of young adults in the short and long term and will expedite their recovery. Special attention should also be directed toward subpopulations at greater risk of being affected, such as women, Arabs, residents of the periphery, and young adults with disability, and effort should be invested in tailoring the solutions to their needs.

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1. Introduction

The transition to adulthood is a significant developmental stage in which a young person (aged 18–34) faces critical crossroads. At those developmental trajectories, they need to make decisions in various facets of life, including work, education, relationships, and family. As a result, this stage of life is characterized by instability accompanied by curiosity, self-exploration, and an examination of values and beliefs (Arnett, 2000). The transition to adulthood can be challenging due to the abrupt shift from a structured daily routine to independent living and personal responsibility, often without formal support and guidance (Boni-Noach et al., 2018). During crises, these challenges intensify and may even lead to crises, due to both the economic and social impact on the national level and the sociodemographic characteristics of young adults which make them more vulnerable in times of crises and disasters. In prolonged crises, such as occur in wartime, the processes of identity formation and skill development for independent living can be disrupted, thus affecting young adults' ability to achieve expected goals in various domains of life.

On Saturday, October 7th, the Israel-Hamas War broke out following the deadly surprise attack by the Hamas organization. From that day until the time of writing, Israel has been at war. As of May 28, 2024, the number of those murdered and the fallen stood at 1,579 people, including 636 IDF casualties. The number of injured was 15,837, and the number of hostages remaining in captivity was 125 (INSS, 2024). 65,032 citizens were recognized as victims of the hostilities (physically, mentally or both) and are being dealt with by the National Insurance Institute (National Insurance Institute, 2024). Fifty-three percent of those murdered and fallen in the first 150 days of the war were aged 18–29 (Roda et al., 2024), which is similar to the proportion of young adults murdered or who fell in battle on October 7th – 52% of those killed on that Saturday were young adults under the age of 30. The highest number of deaths on October 7th was among young adults aged 20–24, who numbered 295 (Weiner, 2023). In addition to the murdered and fallen, many young adults were injured and/or mentally affected; hundreds of thousands were called up for reserve duty (of whom about 118,000 of them were parents; INSS, 2024) or participated in combat as part of their compulsory military service. Many were evacuated from their homes and have yet to return, and they have had to cope with the effects of being uprooted.

Although young adults are present on all fronts in this war, there is little recognition of them as a distinct and vulnerable group. A literature review on the challenges faced by young adults during periods of crises and disasters (Ben Simon and Toporek Bar, 2024) found that they face many difficulties due to the traumatic events they have experienced; the closure of educational institutions and the problem of focusing on learning during

times of mental distress; the loss of employment or a reduction in workhours; changes in living arrangements that also affect family dynamics; and persistent concern about the future. Alongside these difficulties, the literature highlights the resilience demonstrated by young adults and their ability to function effectively even in difficult situations. The past few months have proven the strength of young adults in Israel, their desire to contribute, and their sense of mission, commitment, and optimism. The social support that is characteristic of this recent period and the meaning young adults find in the activities they are involved in are resilience factors that will help them recover from the effects of the war.

The Youth Authority in the Ministry of the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience is interested in improving the services and support provided to young adults and developing policies that will help them build resilience and mitigate, to whatever extent possible, the long-term effects of the war on their lives. Consequently, representatives of the Youth Authority approached the Children, Youth, and Young Adults team at the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, requesting that a survey to be conducted among young adults in order to better understand the impact of the war on their lives.

2. Goals of the Research

The purpose of the survey was to examine the impact of the Israel-Hamas War on young adults aged 18–34 in Israel across various domains of life, such as education, employment, housing, economic status, and health. The survey also sought to identify groups at high risk of being affected by the war. This information is intended to serve as a foundation for planning policies, programs and interventions for young adults and for improving the responses offered to this population group.

Research questions:

1. What changes have occurred in the situation of young adults as a result of the Israel-Hamas War, and in which areas?
2. Which background variables and socioeconomic characteristics (such as region of residence, age, gender, ethnic group, education, and income level) influence the vulnerability level of young adults?
3. Which variables affect the resilience level of young adults and mediate the effects of the war on them?

3. Methodology

3.1 The research population and the sample

At the end of 2022, the population of young adults aged 18–34 in Israel numbered 2,276.9 thousand individuals (Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS], 2023). For the purpose of this survey, questionnaires were completed by 701 young adults. The sample was equally divided by gender. Forty-three percent of the young adults were aged 18–24, making this the largest group, while the age group 25–29 comprised 29%, and the age group 30–34 comprised 28%. Seventy-two percent of the young adults were classified as “Jews and others” (of whom 12% were ultra-Orthodox) and 28% were Arab. Ninety-seven percent of the sample were born in Israel, and 3% were immigrants from various countries around the world. Forty-six percent were single, 37% married, 15% were in a relationship, and 2% were separated or divorced. Seventy-four percent of the sample had no children, 10% had one child, and 16% had two or more. Ten percent of the young adults had no educational certificate (they had completed elementary school, middle school or high school without a diploma), 36% completed high school with a matriculation certificate, 19% had a post-secondary or other certificate, and 35% had an academic degree. Eight percent of the sample met the definition of people with disability, and 26% lived in highly peripheral communities before the war (compared to 40% who lived in medium-level peripheral communities and 34% who lived in highly central communities). The distribution of the sample is presented in **Table 1** (the tables in Appendix A present the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample for different groups among young adults).

Table 1: The sample population by sociodemographic characteristics (percent)

Characteristic	% (N=701)
Gender	100
Men	50
Women	50
Age	100
18-24	43
25-29	29
30-34	28
Population group	100
Jews and others	72
<i>Of which ultra-Orthodox</i>	12

Arabs	28
Muslims	20
<i>Of which Muslim Bedouins</i>	3
Druse	5
Christians	3
Country of birth	100
Israel	97
A different country [^]	3
Marital status	100
Single	46
Married	37
In a relationship / common-law marriage	15
Separated / divorced	2
Number of children	100
None	74
One	10
Two or more	16
Education (highest certificate)	100
No certificate	10
Matriculation certificate	36
Post-secondary certificate	18
Academic degree	35
Other ^{^^}	1
Disability	8
Peripherality index^{^^^}	100
1-4 (peripheral)	26
5-7	40
8-10 (center)	34

[^] Other countries includes the FSU (12 individuals), the US and Western Europe (10) South America (2), Ethiopia (2)

^{^^} Other certificates include individuals who reported a vocational certificate, yeshiva studies and rabbinical certification

^{^^^} This variable is based on the Peripherality Index developed by the CBS. It ranks local authorities according to their geographic location relative to population concentrations. The index is calculated according to potential access and proximity to the boundary of the Tel Aviv district (CBS, 2008). The city of residence was translated into an index value

3.2 Data gathering

The data were collected in a self-reported online survey conducted between January 23 and February 8, 2024, approximately three and a half months after the outbreak of the war. The survey was conducted among 701 young adults aged 18–34 in Israel. The sample was selected to represent the population according to the following variables: age, gender, population group, and level of religiosity (non-ultra-Orthodox Jews, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Arabs). Data collection was carried out by the Geocartography Knowledge Group.

After data collection, the sample was weighted according to gender, age, and population group to achieve an accurate representation of the general population. The calculation was based on population data from the 2023 Statistical Yearbook (CBS, 2023) and on 2022 population projections regarding the ultra-Orthodox population (CBS, 2019). After weighting the sample, the researchers examined the characteristics of the young adults in the weighted sample and found that their characteristics by gender, age, population group, and marital status were almost identical to those of the young adults' population in Israel. However, the sample showed an overrepresentation of young adults from peripheral areas (26% vs. 21%) and those with academic degrees (35% vs. 22%). The representativeness of the sample is presented in **Table 2**.

Table 2: Sociodemographic characteristics of the sample and the population of young adults (percent)

Characteristic	% of sample	Percentage of Population [^]
Gender	100	100
Women	50	51
Men	50	49
Age	100	100
18-24	43	44
25-29	29	29
30-34	28	27
Population group	100	100
Jews	72	73
Of which ultra-Orthodox	12	14
Arabs	28	27
Marital status	100	100
Single ^{^^}	46	64
Married	37	34
In a relationship / common-law marriage	15	-
Separated / Divorced	2	2
Education (highest certificate)	100	100
University graduate	35	22
Not a university graduate	65	78
Peripherality Index	100	100
1-4 (peripheral)	26	21
5+ (not peripheral)	74	79

[^] Data source: gender, age and population group – CBS 2023; population forecasts as of the end of 2022 for the ultra-Orthodox – CBS, 2019; marital status and education – data processing of CBS Labor Force Survey for 2022 by the Brookdale Institute; periphery – data processing of CBS Household Expenses Survey for 2021 by the Brookdale Institute

^{^^} The Labor Force Survey does not have the option of “in a relationship” and the young adults in that category are included as singles. This explains the difference in the proportion of singles in the current survey and in the population data

3.3 Research methods

The questionnaire was administered in Hebrew and Arabic and included closed-ended questions about the demographic characteristics of the respondents, as well as various domains of their lives, such as education, employment, health, emotional state, economic situation, social involvement, trust in the government and public institutions, and the impact of the terrorist attack on October 7th and the resultant emergency situation in Israel. The construction of the questionnaire was based on a literature review and questionnaires from relevant studies and surveys, such as the CBS Social Survey and surveys conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Youth Authority in the Ministry of the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience, as well as research on young adults.

3.4 Data Analysis

The data were analyzed using SPSS software. The research team used the χ^2 test for distributions (in percentages) in order to examine the Group Differences in the study and the relationship between categorical variables. The data were analyzed according to the following variables: gender, population group, degree of peripherality, and disability status. In addition, a multivariate analysis using logistic regression was performed to explain the outcome variables of low mental state and economic hardship due to the war, utilizing the young adults' background variables and resilience factors according to the professional literature.

3.5 Research Ethics

The Ethics Committee of the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute approved the study. The objectives of the research were explained to the respondents in the link sent to them, and it was made clear that they were not obligated to participate and could withdraw at any time. They were also given the option to skip questions they were uncomfortable answering. It was further noted that the questionnaire is anonymous, and all collected information would be kept confidential and used solely for research purposes, without the possibility of identifying the participants. Respondents were provided with an estimate of the time required to complete the questionnaire, as well as the researcher's email address for inquiries, questions, and comments. Only respondents who declared that they had read and understood the objectives and conditions of participation and gave their consent to participate freely were directed to the questionnaire.

4. Findings

4.1 The effects of the war on young adults according to various domains of life

The transition to adulthood is characterized by the exploration of various life roles in the domains of education, employment, relationships, parenthood, and belonging. During this phase, young adults develop and solidify their identities and future paths. Crises and disasters can challenge the completion of these tasks for a variety of reasons: prolonged military service, evacuation from home for an unknown period, closure of educational institutions and childcare frameworks, closure of workplace or reduction in workhours, and effects on mental health due to stress and anxiety associated with crises. In the survey, respondents were asked about changes in their lives due to the war and the direct impact of the October 7th events and the war. The findings are presented below.

4.1.1 Direct Impact of the October 7th events and the war on young adults

Table 3 presents the direct impact of the October 7th events and the war on the respondents. Analysis of the findings shows that 25% of the young adults were affected: 8% stated they were called up for reserve duty and 6% reported that their partner was called up; 3% reported being evacuated from their homes; 2% had their homes or property destroyed, and 2% were directly exposed to the October 7th events (e.g., living in a community that was infiltrated by terrorists or attending one of the parties that took place that Saturday). Five percent of the young adults chose the "Other" option, indicating they were mentally affected, exposed to rocket fire or experienced traumatic events as soldiers. It was also found that 16% of the young adults live or lived in an area that was attacked or evacuated. The analysis of the responses suggests that these 16% included not only young adults who lived in areas that were directly attacked (terrorist infiltration or attempted infiltration) but also young adults who lived in areas with high threat levels and that were fully or partially evacuated, such as Ashkelon, Beersheba, Ashdod, Netivot, and Nahariya. This percentage also includes a few cases of young adults from areas that were not directly attacked or evacuated, such as Tel Aviv. This is possibly explained by the perception of rocket fire as an attack or that the respondents lived for a short time in a place that was attacked and therefore reported accordingly.

The young adults were asked if any of their family members, relatives or friends were harmed in the October 7th events or the war. 32% reported affirmatively: 17% reported that family members, relatives or friends were murdered or killed; 14% reported that family members, relatives or friends were directly exposed to the October 7th events; 8% reported that family members, relatives or friends were physically injured; 6% reported that family

members, relatives or friends had their homes or property destroyed, and 3% reported that family members, relatives or friends were kidnapped.

A summary index of the direct impact on the young adults and/or someone close to them was constructed, and it was found that 41% of the young adults were either affected themselves, had someone close to them affected or both: 14% of the young adults were both personally affected and had someone close to them affected; 10% of the young adults were personally affected but not someone close to them; and 17% were not personally affected, but someone close to them was.

Table 3: The direct effect of the October 7th events and the war (percent)

Type of effect	Total (N=701)
Living or lived in an area attacked or evacuated	16
Directly affected by the terror attacks / the war – any level[^]	25
Called up for reserve duty	8
Partner called up	6
Evacuated	3
Home or property destroyed	2
Direct effect of the October 7 th events (such as penetration of terrorists, presence at a party)	2
Physically harmed	1
Other ^{^^}	5
A family member, relative or friend was directly harmed	32
Murdered/killed	17
Exposed to the October 7 th events (such as penetration of terrorists, presence at a party)	14
Physically harmed	8
Home or property damage	6
Kidnapped	3
Summary index: Young person or someone close to them was harmed	100
No one	59
Only a family member, relative or friend	17
Only the person himself	10
Both	14

[^] The percentages do not add up to 100 (in “any level of effect”) because more than one answer could be given; 5% of the respondents chose not to answer this question and therefore they were not included in the total

^{^^} Young adults that responded “other”: 16 answered mental harm; 8 answered the threat of missiles/rockets; 4 answered exposed to events as a soldier

Groups differences



The percentage of young Arabs who reported being directly affected by the events of October 7th was lower by near half than that of young 'Jews and others' (15% vs. 28%). It should be noted that a higher percentage of young Arabs chose not to answer this question (12% as compared to 2% among young 'Jews and others'). Similarly, the percentage of young Arabs who reported that a family member, relative or friend was affected was much lower than among young 'Jews and others' (18% vs. 37%), and 16% chose not to answer this question (compared to 2% of young 'Jews and others').

4.1.2 Housing and Living Arrangements

The respondents were asked to describe their living arrangements before the war, assuming that some of them had to make temporary changes to their place of residence following the terror attack on the western Negev communities and the security threat in both the South and the North that necessitated evacuation from their homes. 45% of the young adults indicated that before the war they lived with their families, 36% lived with a partner and/or children, 9% lived alone, 6% lived with roommates, and 4% lived with both family members and a partner and/or children. Among the young adults who lived with their families, 74% lived in a family-owned apartment. Among the young adults who lived with a partner and/or children, 53% lived in rented apartment, 27% lived in their own apartment, and 14% lived in a family-owned apartment. It was also found that 3% of the young adults were evacuated from their homes, with approximately 70% of them being evacuated from southern communities and the rest from northern communities. Among the evacuees, 43% lived with members of their original community. When asked about their new living arrangements, 48% reported that they were living with their extended family, 28% reported living in a rented apartment, and 24% reported being housed in a hotel. It is possible that the percentage of evacuees housed in hotels was higher at the beginning of the war, and that by the time of the survey, they had already moved to other accommodations.

4.1.3 Education


Figure 1 shows the impact of the war on plans to study by population group. The graph indicates that 39% of young adults stated they were studying for an academic degree or were in vocational training before the war, and 23% stated they had planned to study in the 2023/24 academic year but decided to abandon their plans. Among those who decided not to study, 57% said they plan to enroll again next year, 8% said they do not plan to enroll, and 35% said they are unsure whether they will enroll next year.

Group Differences



There were significant gaps between young Arabs and young 'Jews and others': Among young Arabs, the percentage of those studying before the war was higher (49% compared to 35% among young 'Jews and others'), as was the percentage of those who gave up on studying this year (35% as compared to 19% among young 'Jews and others'). However, the percentage of young adults who plan to re-enroll in studies next year was also higher among young Arabs relative to young 'Jews and others' (70% vs. 49%) (**Figure 1**).

Figure 1: The effect of the war on plans to study, by population group (N=688, percent)



4.1.4 Employment

Before the outbreak of the war, 86% of the young adults were employed (including those in compulsory military service): 69% were salaried employees, 5% were self-employed, 5% worked both as salaried employees and as self-employed, and 7% were serving in the army or doing national service. Fourteen of the young adults were not employed: 9% were unemployed and looking for work, and 5% were neither employed nor looking for work. At the time of the survey, about three and a half months after the war began, the percentage of those reporting being employed (including compulsory military service) was 14 percentage points lower (72%): 67% of the young adults were employed, and 5% were in compulsory military service. Additionally, 4% of the young adults reported that they were doing reserve military duty. The data indicate that the employment of 28% of the young adults who were employed before the war was terminated as a result of the war. The reasons given were as follows: being placed on unpaid leave (34%), temporary or permanent closure of the business (23%), a security situation that prevented them from reaching their workplace (16%), being called up for reserve duty (12%), being laid off (10%), and other reasons such as workforce reduction and resignations for the purpose of,


for example, staying home with their children (5%) (**Figure 2**). 40% of the young adults whose employment was terminated reported that they were not eligible for unemployment benefits (allowance?). Some of them noted that they were only eligible for unemployment benefits (allowance?) for a short period.

Group Differences



No differences were found between groups in the percentage of young adults whose employment was terminated due to the war. However, differences were found in the reasons for the termination of employment between men and women, between 'Jews and others' and Arabs, and between residents of very peripheral areas and those of very central areas. A higher percentage of men, 'Jews and others', and young adults living in very central locations were called up for reserve duty: 22% of men compared to 3% of women, 16% of 'Jews and others' as compared to none of the young Arabs, and 20% of young adults from very central locations (8-10 on the periphery index) compared to 8% of residents of very peripheral locations (1-4 on the periphery index). On the other hand, a higher percentage of women and Arabs were laid off: 15% of women as compared to 3% of men, and 15% of young Arabs as compared to 8% of 'Jews and others'. Another significant difference between young 'Jews and others' and young Arabs, in addition to their peripherality, was found in being sent on unpaid leave, with twice as many Arabs being placed on unpaid leave due to the war: 54% of Arabs vs. 27% of 'Jews and others', and more than twice as many residents of peripheral areas: 48% of residents of peripheral areas as compared to 23% of residents of central areas (**Figure 2**).


Figure 2: Main reason for termination of employment as a result of the war, by gender, population group and peripherality index (N=137; percent)



The young adults who reported that they were not working during the week before the survey (28%) were asked about the main reason they were unable to start working that week. Their responses indicated that the main reasons were studies (42% were studying), reserve duty (16% were serving), and the inability of their primary workplace to return to normal operations (14%). Other reasons included illness (8% reported being sick) and difficulty in finding childcare arrangements (6%). Job search and maternity leave were also reported.

The young adults who reported that they were working during the week before the survey (67%, not including those serving in the army) were asked if they continued working at their primary workplace and if there had been any change in their workhours due to the war. It was found that 97% of the young adults continued working at their primary workplace, while 3% started a new job since the war began. Among those who continued at the same workplace, 63% reported no change in their workhours, 25% reported a reduction in their workhours, and 9% reported an increase in their workhours (**Figure 3**). Among the young adults who reported being self-employed before the war (10%), 43% indicated that they were approved for a grant, a state-guaranteed loan or other assistance, while 57% stated that they did not receive any assistance.

Figure 3: Changes in workhours and workplace as a result of the war (N=393; percent)



Group differences



Also according to this metric, young Arabs were more affected than young 'Jews and others'—35% of them indicated that they continued to work at the same workplace but their workhours were reduced, as compared to 21% of 'Jews and others'.



Young adults living in peripheral areas were also more affected than those in central areas in terms of reduced workhours (33% of young adults in the periphery vs. 19% of young adults in the center).



Among ultra-Orthodox young adults, there was greater stability relative to non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others': 75% of them continued to work at their primary workplace without a change in their workhours, compared to 62% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others'. The percentage of young adults whose workhours were reduced was similar among ultra-Orthodox and non-ultra-Orthodox young adults (21% and 22%, respectively), but a higher percentage of non-ultra-Orthodox young adults had their workhours increased (10% among non-ultra-Orthodox young adults as compared to 4% among ultra-Orthodox young adults). Similarly, a higher percentage of non-ultra-Orthodox young adults started a new job relative to ultra-Orthodox young adults (6% vs. none).

4.1.5 Economic situation

The respondents reported that the war was having an economic impact on them. While before the war, 23% of young adults had an overdraft in their checking accounts, by the time of the survey, the percentage of young adults with an overdraft had increased by ten percentage points to 33% (**Figure 4**). Additionally, 17% of young adults reported that their ability to meet financial obligations had been significantly impaired due to the war, and 36% reported that it had somewhat decreased. Sixteen percent of young adults reported that they regularly receive financial assistance from their parents, and 39% reported that they receive financial assistance from their parents occasionally. The young adults were not asked if there had been a change in this metric due to the war. Most young adults reported that they were not satisfied with their financial situation (62%), but most also reported that they believe that their financial situation will improve in coming years (65%).

Group differences



The economic impact was felt by both population groups, but it was more severe among young Arabs, thereby widening the gaps that existed even before the war. The percentage of young Arabs with an overdraft in their checking accounts increased by 18 percentage points, from 41% before the war to 59% at the time of the survey, while among young 'Jews and others', the increase was only six percentage points, from 17% to 23% (**Figure 4**). Accordingly, the ability to meet financial obligations was more significantly impaired among young Arabs than among young 'Jews and others' (28% vs. 12%).



Among ultra-Orthodox young adults, there was an increase of ten percentage points in the proportion of those with an overdraft (21% before the war to 31% at the time of the survey), while among non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others', the increase was only six percentage points (from 16% to 22%).



The proportion of young adults with an overdraft was higher among young adults living in peripheral areas than those living in very central areas even before the war (38% vs. 15%), and this gap widened as a result of the war: the percentage of young adults in peripheral areas with an overdraft increased by 12 percentage points (to 50% at the time of the survey), while among those in central areas, it increased by only four percentage points (to 19%) (Figure 4). Accordingly, the number of young adults whose ability to meet financial obligations was significantly impaired by the war was threefold higher among young adults in the periphery than in central areas (27% vs. 8%).




Among young adults with disability, it was found that while before the war their overdraft situation was similar to that of young adults without disability (23% of young adults in both groups had an overdraft), the war had a much larger impact on them—50% of young adults with disability reported having an overdraft at the time of the survey, as compared to only 31% of young adults without disability (Figure 4).

For comparison

The economic impact of the war can also be seen in the data from the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a), in which 58% of young adults reported being satisfied with their financial situation as compared to only 38% of those in the current survey.

Figure 4: The overdraft in a checking account before the war and at the time of the survey (N=659; percent)



4.1.6 Physical and mental health

Physical Health – 96% of young adults reported that they generally enjoy good health. Seventy-five indicated that their health status had not changed as a result of the war, 17% reported that it had deteriorated, and 3% said it had improved. Five percent stated that they did not know or did not want to answer.

Group differences



The deterioration in health status was more pronounced among women than men (22% of young women reported a deterioration compared to 11% of young men) and among young Arabs compared to young 'Jews and others' (25% vs. 13%).



In contrast, it appears that the war's impact on the health of ultra-Orthodox young adults was less significant: 89% reported that their health status had not changed during the war (compared to 79% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others'), and 5% reported that their health had deteriorated (compared to 15% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others').



The health status of young adults with disability was worse even before the war (25% reported an inferior health situation compared to 2% of young adults without disability), and the war further exacerbated the situation—40% reported a deterioration in their health as compared to 14% of young adults without disability.

Mental Health – Compared with physical health, the percentage of young adults who reported generally good mental health was lower before the war: 82% of young adults reported good mental health, while 18% reported a low level of mental health. This situation worsened due to the war: 50% of young adults stated that their mental health had deteriorated, 43% said it remained unchanged, and 3% reported an improvement. 4% stated that they did not know or did not want to answer.

Group differences



The deterioration in mental health was more pronounced among women than men (61% vs. 38%), among young Arabs relative to young 'Jews and others' (66% vs. 44%), and among young adults with disability compared to those without disability (78% vs. 48%) (**Figure 5**).




In contrast, the impact on mental health was less significant among ultra-Orthodox young adults—56% reported that their mental health did not change as a result of the war (compared to 48% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others'), and 33% reported that their mental health had deteriorated (compared to 46% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others'). Additionally, 9% of ultra-Orthodox young adults indicated that they did

not know if their mental health had changed due to the war or were not interested in answering the question (compared to 4% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others').

For comparison

In the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a), the percentage of those reporting generally good mental health was higher than in the current survey: 93% vs. 82%. It is possible that as a result of the war young adults in the current survey reported poorer mental health even when asked about their general mental state.

Figure 5: Changes in mental state as a result of the war, by gender, population group and disability (N=701; percent)



In addition to reporting their physical and mental health, the young adults were asked to indicate how often in the past month they had experienced any of the following four conditions: stress or anxiety, depression, the ability to cope with problems, and feeling energetic. Seventy-one percent of the young adults often or sometimes felt stress or anxiety, and 61% felt depressed. On the other hand, 47% reported feeling energetic, and 73% indicated that they felt capable of coping with their problems.

Group Differences



Emotional difficulties were more common among women than men: 83% of young women reported stress or anxiety (compared to 59% of young men); 72% of young women reported depression (compared to 51% of young men); and 42% of young women reported feeling energetic (compared to 52% of young men).



Young adults with disability also experienced more emotional difficulties compared to those without disability: 91% of young adults with disability reported stress or anxiety (compared to 70% of those without disability); 84% of young adults with disability reported depression (compared to 60% of those without disability); and 51% of young adults with disability reported feeling capable of coping with their problems (compared to 74% of those without disability).



Among ultra-Orthodox young adults, lower percentages of emotional difficulties were recorded (57% felt stress or anxiety compared to 70% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others', and 52% felt depressed as compared to 62% of non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others') alongside higher percentages of feeling capable of coping with problems and feeling energetic (85% and 67%, respectively, as compared to 78% and 45%, respectively).



Differences between young Arabs and young 'Jews and others' were found in two metrics: feelings of stress or anxiety (81% of young Arabs as compared to 68% of young 'Jews and others') and the ability to cope with problems (54% of young Arabs as compared to 79% of young 'Jews and others').



Among young adults living in peripheral areas, a lower percentage reported feeling capable of coping with problems (62% as compared to 79% of young adults living in central areas).

For comparison

In the case of all four metrics, the emotional state of young adults was significantly better in peace (routine?) time than during the war. In the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a), a lower percentage of young adults reported feelings of stress (58% as compared to 71% reporting stress or anxiety in the current survey) and depression (22% as compared to 61% in the current survey). Conversely, a higher percentage of young adults in the Social Survey reported positive feelings: 94% reported being able to cope with problems (compared to 73% in the current survey) and 84% reported feeling energetic (compared to 47% in the current survey).

4.1.7 Support Systems

Social support plays an important role in coping with stress and distress. According to the young adults surveyed, 91% have at least one person to turn to in times of crisis or distress. The respondents could select more than one answer to the question of whom they turn to in times of crisis or distress, and the analysis shows that 30% have one person to turn to, 25% have two, 23% have three, and 13% have four or more.


Group differences



Significant differences were found between young 'Jews and others' and young Arabs and between young adults with disability and those without disability with regard to the number of adults they can turn to in times of crisis or distress. It was found that 18% of young Arabs have no one to turn to, while only 5% of young 'Jews and others' reported that (**Figure 6**). Additionally, 43% of young Arabs have only one person to turn to, 22% have two, and 17% have three or more. In contrast, the majority of young 'Jews and others' reported having more than one person to turn to: 27% have two, 27% have three, and 17% have four or more. In the case of young adults with disability, the differences are particularly significant with regard to the percentage who have no support at all or have limited support: 25% of young adults with disability reported having no one to turn to in times of crisis or distress (compared to 7% of those without disability), and 18% reported having only one person to turn to (compared to 30% of those without disability).

Most young adults view their parents as a source of support, with 60% reporting that they would turn to them in times of crisis or distress. The second most common source of support is a partner (50%), followed by friends (42%) and other family members (32%). Eleven percent of young adults reported turning to people from their close community (neighbors and coworkers), and the same percentage reported turning to a professional (**Figure 6**). It appears that even the war did not change the tendency of young adults not to seek professional help. Only 5% reported that they started receiving mental health support from a professional due to the war, and 6% reported that they had already been receiving professional support before the war. Fifty-nine percent of young adults reported that they did not feel the need to seek professional help, and 30% said they would have liked to, but it did not happen.

Figure 6: Sources of support – Do you have someone to turn to in a time of crisis or distress, by population group (N=701; percent)



4.1.8 Civic and social involvement and a sense of belonging

Young adults were asked to express their level of agreement with four statements related to social involvement and their sense of belonging to their community. Two statements addressed their feelings before the war, and two during the war. The findings indicate that there was no significant change in these metrics among the young adults overall. According to the young adults' reports (those responding "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree"), 39% were involved in promoting social or community goals important to them before the war, and 42% were involved during the war. Additionally, it was found that before the war, 52% felt part of the community in their place of residence, while following the war, 53% felt that way (**Figure 7**).


Group differences



There were no significant changes in the sense of belonging to the community by population group.

However, differences were found in involvement in promoting social goals between the two periods among both young 'Jews and others' and young Arabs, although they showed opposite trends. Among young 'Jews and others', the level of involvement increased following the war (from 35% to 44%), whereas among young Arabs, it decreased significantly (from 51% to 37%) (**Figure 7**).

Figure 7: Differences in social involvement and a sense of belonging to the community prior to the war and during the war, by population group (N=649; strongly agree or somewhat agree)



It was also found that since the outbreak of the war, 61% of young adults have engaged in some form of volunteer activity (either within the framework of organizations like Magen David Adom, Yad Sarah, and civil society organizations or privately by helping neighbors and friends) or they donated money to social welfare organizations or to individuals (excluding family and friends): 46% donated money, and 43% volunteered (**Figure 8**).

Group differences




It was found that women are more involved than men, 'Jews and others' are more involved than Arabs, and young adults living in central areas are more involved than those in peripheral areas: 65% of young women volunteered or donated money compared to 56% of young men (the differences were particularly significant in the case of monetary donations), 67% of young 'Jews and others' volunteered or donated money as compared to 45% of young Arabs (the differences were significant in both types of involvement), and 65% of young adults in central areas volunteered or donated money as compared to 55% of young adults in peripheral areas (the differences were particularly significant in the case of monetary donations).

For comparison

According to the 2022 Statistical Abstract on Volunteering, Social Involvement, and Activism (Bar et al., 2022), 67% of the young adults who participated in the survey donated money to a cause they cared about during the past year, 62% donated time to help others outside of organized frameworks, and 48% volunteered within an

organized framework, whether a nonprofit or a local, governmental or public authority. This survey found that men volunteer and are involved more than women, especially in the case of monetary donations (71% of men compared to 63% of women), that young Arabs are less involved than young Jews, and that religious and ultra-Orthodox young adults are more involved and volunteer more than secular young adults. Comparing the current survey with the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a) indicates a higher percentage of young adults engaged in volunteer activities during the war (43% were involved in volunteer activities since the war began as compared to 23% in the past year according to the Social Survey) and a lower percentage who donated money (46% donated money since the war began as compared to 55% in the past year according to the Social Survey). The decline in the percentage of donors was observed only among young 'Jews and others'; among young Arabs, the percentage of donors was the same in the current survey and the Social Survey. However, with regard to participation in volunteer activities, there were more significant differences between the current survey and the Social Survey among young Arabs. Thus, in the Social Survey 11% reported involvement in volunteer activities in the past year, while in the current survey, 37% reported involvement in volunteer activities since the outbreak of the war.

Figure 8: Social involvement during the war, by gender, population group and periphery index (N=690; percent)



4.1.9 Trust in political and public institutions

Young adults were asked about their level of trust in various political and public institutions and whether their views had changed as a result of the war. The findings show that trust in the government was the lowest: only 26% of young adults said they have trust in the government, as compared to 75% who expressed trust in the IDF, 69% who expressed trust in the health services, 50% who expressed trust in education services, 46% who expressed trust in local authorities, and 45% who expressed trust in welfare services (**Figure 9**).

Group differences



The level of trust in public institutions among young Arabs was lower than that among young 'Jews and others', with significant differences observed in the case of many of the institutions (**Figure 9**).




The level of trust in public institutions among young ultra-Orthodox Jews was higher than among non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others' for all of the institutions included in the survey, except for the police.



The level of trust among young adults with disability in public institutions was lower than that of young adults without disability, with particularly significant differences in trust in the IDF (59% vs. 77%), the police (44% vs. 60%), health services (57% vs. 70%), and education services (39% vs. 51%).

Figure 9: Level of trust in political and public institutions (to a large extent or to some extent), by population group (N=685; percent)



An analysis of the findings on the change in trust in public institutions due to the war reveals that not only was trust in the government the lowest, but it also deteriorated the most during the war: 64% of young adults reported that their trust in the government declined as a result of the war. For other institutions, the percentage of young adults reporting a decline in trust was much lower, ranging from 18% (health services) to 33% (IDF).

Group differences



As mentioned, the percentage of young Arabs expressing trust was lower for all institutions in the survey, and it appears that the war significantly impacted this metric as well. The percentage of young Arabs reporting a decrease in trust was higher than among Jews and others. The differences between the two groups were particularly significant in the case of the police, health services, IDF, and local authorities (**Figure 10**).



Compared to non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews and others', a much higher percentage of ultra-Orthodox young adults reported no change in their level of trust across all the institutions included in the survey, and a lower percentage of ultra-Orthodox young adults reported a decline in trust.



Differences were found between young adults living in peripheral areas and those in central areas in the case of three institutions: a higher percentage of young adults in peripheral areas reported an increase in their trust in the government (11% as compared to 4% of those in central areas), in education services (18% as compared to 10%), and in welfare services (18% as compared to 9%).




Among young adults with disability, differences were also found in the case of three institutions: a higher percentage of young adults with disability reported an increase in their trust in the government (20% as compared to 5% of young adults without disability). However, a higher percentage of young adults with disability reported a decrease in their trust in health services (33% as compared to 17% of those without disability) and in welfare services (44% as compared to 27%, respectively).

For comparison

The percentage of young adults who reported trust in three of the institutions (the government, the IDF, and health services) was similar in the current survey and the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a for the government and health services; CBS, 2021 for the IDF) (a difference of 1–4 percentage points). Differences were found in the case of two institutions: the percentage of young adults who expressed trust in local authorities was lower in the current survey (46%) than in the Social Survey (62%), while the percentage of young adults who expressed trust in the police was higher in the current survey (58%) than in the Social Survey (43%) (CBS, 2022a).

Figure 10: The deterioration in the level of trust in political and public institutions as a result of the war, by population group (N=685; percent)



4.1.10 A feeling of optimism

As in the case of social support, social involvement, and trust in public institutions, optimism is also mentioned in the literature as a resilience factor that provides resources for coping in times of crisis and disaster. Young adults were asked about their outlook on the future with respect to their economic situation (whether they believe it will be better, worse or unchanged in coming years) and their life satisfaction (whether they believe their life will be better, worse or unchanged in coming years). A composite index was created to measure the level of optimism among young adults. It was found that 54% of young adults are very optimistic (reporting that both their overall situation and their economic situation will be better in the future), and 14% are somewhat optimistic (reporting that their situation will be better in one of these aspects). On the other hand, 8% of young adults were very pessimistic about their future (reporting that both their overall situation and their economic situation will be worse), and 7% were somewhat pessimistic (reporting that one aspect will remain unchanged and the other will worsen) (**Figure 11**).

Group differences



The percentage of young Arabs who expressed pessimism about their future was higher than the percentage of young 'Jews and others' (27% vs. 11%) (**Figure 11**).



Similarly, the percentage of young adults living in peripheral areas who were pessimistic was higher than that of young adults in central areas (20% vs. 12%).




In contrast, ultra-Orthodox young adults showed significant optimism: 72% of them were very optimistic, and 17% were somewhat optimistic, as compared to 55% and 16%, respectively, among non-ultra-Orthodox 'Jews & others' (**Figure 11**).

For comparison

The impact of the war on the sense of optimism can be seen by comparing the current survey with the Social Survey (CBS, 2022a). In the Social Survey, 78% of young adults believed that their economic situation would improve in coming years, and 83% believed their lives would be better in coming years. In the current survey, 65% of young adults thought their economic situation would improve, and the same percentage thought their lives would be better.

Figure 11: The feeling of optimism with regard to the future, by population group and level of religiosity (N=685; percent)



4.2 The effect of sociodemographic characteristics and resilience factors on the response to times of crisis and disaster

The data indicate that certain population groups, such as women, Arabs, young adults with disability, and those living in peripheral areas, may be more vulnerable than other groups in crisis and disaster situations. In order to isolate the interactions between the variables examined and to explain the risk factors for being affected by the war, several logistic regression models were estimated. Initially, the dependent variable used was “deterioration in mental health due to the war” (1=yes, 0=no), and three logistic regression models were estimated (**Table 4**). The first model included only the sociodemographic characteristics of the young adults: gender, age, population group, marital status, parenthood, education, income level, disability, and residence in the periphery. In the second model, resilience characteristics (sources of support and optimism) were added, and in the third model, the variable “ability to meet financial obligations” was also included. The results for all three models indicate that women, Arabs, young adults in relationships (not married), and young adults with disability have a significantly higher likelihood of reporting a deterioration in their mental health due to the war. The relationship between living in a peripheral area and mental health was the opposite—living in a peripheral area reduced the likelihood of reporting a deterioration in mental health. Other characteristics found to be associated with a deterioration in mental health (Model 2) included professional support and general optimism, while parental support was found to be inversely related—it reduced the likelihood of reporting a deterioration in mental health. Additionally, a connection was found between a deterioration in economic conditions (difficulty in meeting financial obligations) and a deterioration in mental health (Model 3).

Table 4: A logistic regression to explain the reporting of a deterioration in mental health as a result of the war

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	Odds Ratio	B	Odds Ratio	B	Odds Ratio
Women	0.98	2.68**	1.03	2.79**	0.96	2.62**
Age (continuous)	0.02	1.02	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01
Population group (relative to non-ultra-Orthodox Jews)						
Arabs	1.12	3.06**	1.01	2.73**	0.84	2.34**
ultra-Orthodox Jews	0.38-	0.68	0.45-	0.64	0.40-	0.67
Marital Status (relative to young adults without a partner)						
Married	0.22-	0.80	0.29-	0.75	0.25-	0.78
In a relationship	0.54	1.71*	0.52	1.69*	0.59	1.80*
Parents of children	0.04-	0.96	0.03-	0.97	0.09-	0.92
University graduates	0.32	1.37	0.30	1.35	0.38	1.46
Level of income (relative to no income / lower than average income)						
Average or higher than average income	0.46-	0.63*	0.47-	0.63*	0.38-	0.66
Didn't answer the question	0.54	1.72	0.43	1.54	0.53	1.69
Disability	1.54	4.65**	1.26	3.53**	1.26	3.52**
Living in the periphery before the war (1-4 cluster)	0.51-	0.60*	0.51-	0.60*	0.60-	0.55**
Sources of support (relative to none)						
Parents			0.41-	0.67*	0.33-	0.72
Professionals			0.60	1.82*	0.55	1.73
Someone else (relative or friends)			0.23-	0.80	0.32-	0.73
Life expectation in coming years (relative to "will be better")						
Will remain unchanged			0.09	1.09	0.02-	0.98
Will be worse			0.78	2.18**	0.61	1.84*
Economic deterioration (relative to "ability to meet financial obligations has not changed / improved")						
Somewhat less able					0.73	2.07**
Significantly less able					0.69	2.00*
Nagelkerke Pseudo R² (%)	20.8		24.4		26.5	

* p<.05 ** p<.01

The second dependent variable that was selected to study the effects of the war was “ability to meet financial obligations”. A dichotomous variable was constructed to examine the change in young adults’ ability to meet financial obligations (1 = declined somewhat / declined significantly, 0 = remained unchanged / improved), and a logistic regression model was estimated (**Table 5**). The model included the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents (gender, age, population group, marital status, parenthood, education, income level, disability, and residence in the periphery), and resilience characteristics (sources of support and optimism), as well as a variable for employment termination due to the war. The model revealed that the strongest explanatory variable was employment termination. Young adults whose employment had been discontinued due to the war were 5.19 times more likely to report a deterioration in their financial situation (compared to those whose employment was not discontinued and those who were not employed before the war). It was also found that Arabs were 2.42 times more likely to report an economic impact, parents of children were 1.79 times more likely, young adults living in peripheral areas were 1.55 times more likely, and young women were 1.46 times more likely. Another explanatory factor was pessimism (1.70 times more likely). An inverse relationship was found in the case of two variables—support from parents reduced reports of economic impact (by 0.66 times) as did an average or higher-than-average income (by 0.53 times).

Table 5: A logistic regression to explain reporting of lower ability to meet financial commitments as a result of the war

Variable	B	Odds Ratio
Women	0.38	1.46*
Age (continuous)	0.01	1.01
Population group (relative to non-ultra-Orthodox Jews)		
Arabs	0.88	2.42**
ultra-Orthodox Jews	0.49-	0.61
Marital status (relative to young adults without a partner)		
Married	0.32-	0.73
In a relationship	0.52-	0.60
Parents of children	0.58	1.79*
University graduates	0.25-	0.78
Level of income (relative to no income / lower-than-average income)		
Average or higher-than-average income	0.64-	0.53**
Didn't answer the question	0.29-	0.75
Disability	0.09	1.10
Residence in the periphery before the war (clusters 1–4)	0.44	1.55*
Sources of support (relative to none)		
Parents	0.41-	0.66*
Professionals	0.42	1.53
Someone else (relative or friend)	0.02-	0.96
Life expectation in coming years (relative to "life will be better")		
Will remain unchanged / will be worse	0.53	1.70**
Employment terminated as a result of the war (relative to not terminated / didn't work)	1.65	5.19**
Nagelkerke Pseudo R² (%)	26.2	

* p<.05 ** p<.01

5. Limitations of the research

The sample is representative of the young population according to four variables: gender, age groups, population groups (Jews and others and Arabs), and level of religiosity (non-ultra-Orthodox Jews and ultra-Orthodox Jews). However, the sample is biased due to an overrepresentation of young adults with an academic education, particularly among young Arabs. Additionally, the survey was conducted through a panel survey company. Thus, there is no way to calculate the response rate, and respondents were compensated for completing the questionnaire with reward points that could be redeemed for shopping vouchers. However, the financial incentives were very small.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been engaged in a war in the South and is under a continuous security threat in the North. The ongoing state of emergency is affecting economic and social infrastructures, with its impact felt across the entire population of Israel. The effect on young adults and their ability to recover may be particularly complex due to the inherent instability of the transition to adulthood. During this life stage, changes and transitions occur across various domains, such as employment, education, relationships, parenthood, housing, and belonging (Arnett, 2000). Therefore, it is a particularly vulnerable time for disruptions in the “normative” developmental trajectory of young adults (O’Donohue et al., 2021). Crises and disasters can present young adults with challenges in completing their tasks for various reasons: prolonged service in the combat forces, evacuation from home for an indefinite period, closure of educational institutions and childcare frameworks, closure of workplaces or reduction in workhours, and the mental health impacts due to the stress and anxiety that are characteristic of crisis periods.

More than two million young adults aged 18–34 live in Israel. Hundreds of thousands of them were drafted into reserve service when the Israel-Hamas War broke out, and many others are in compulsory military service. Young adults, more than any other age group, were affected by the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and in the subsequent months of the war. Tens of thousands were personally exposed to the attack and the war, and many more know family members and friends who were murdered, killed, injured, kidnapped, evacuated from their homes or otherwise harmed. At this point in time, young adults are dealing not only with exposure to traumatic events and their effects on mental health but also with effects in other areas of life, such as education and employment, forcing them to make changes to their daily routines. This study has examined the effects of the Israel-Hamas War on young adults across various facets of life and its impact on their attitudes towards public and governmental institutions. The study was conducted at the request of the Youth Authority in the Ministry of the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience and was based on an online questionnaire completed by a representative sample of 701 young adults.

The research findings indicate the widespread negative impact of the war on young adults and corroborate the results of other studies on youth in crises and disasters. As in the case of studies that examined the effects on education (Di Pietro, 2018; Kurapov et al., 2023), employment (Bosco & Harvey, 2003; Ganson et al., 2021), housing

(Conrad et al., 2021), and mental health (Chaaya et al., 2022; Myles et al., 2018), this study also found that young adults made adjustments regarding their studies (23% gave up on studies during the year of the war); faced job loss (28% of young adults experienced employment termination) and dealt with uncertainty in the employment sector, which led to economic hardship (53% reported a decrease in their ability to meet financial obligations); experienced a deterioration in their mental state (50%); and coped with the direct effects of the war, including loss and bereavement, physical and psychological injury, destruction of homes and property, and evacuation from their homes and communities (25%). One of the evacuation's impacts revealed by the study was a disconnect from their original community—57% of the young adults who were evacuated from their homes did not live with members of their community. This is significant since social support can be highly beneficial in coping with terrorist attacks by maintaining a sense of community (Okay & Karanci, 2019).

Alongside these challenges, the data also highlight the resilience of young adults. Studies point to resilience factors such as optimism (Weinberg et al., 2016), social support (Forbes et al., 2012; Okay & Karanci, 2019), trust in political and public systems (Ford et al., 2003), and religious faith (Bleich et al., 2003; Ford et al., 2003; Uecker, 2008), which provide resources for coping during crises and disasters. The literature also shows that social involvement and volunteering help in coping with crises and disasters and enhance the sense of resilience (Carlton et al., 2022; Freeman et al., 2015). Data from this study show that 54% of young adults are very optimistic, 91% have at least one person they can turn to in times of crisis or distress, and 61% have engaged in some form of volunteer activity since the outbreak of the war or donated money to social organizations or individuals (excluding close relatives and friends). Volunteering during crises and disasters allows volunteers to be active within their community and to effect change. It also empowers the volunteer, gives them a sense of purpose, and even helps them to personally cope with the effects of the disaster (Carlton et al., 2022). One of the study's interesting findings is that the most common source of support is parents – 60% of young adults reported turning to their parents in times of crisis or distress. This finding aligns with other studies which found that young adults particularly value the support they receive from their family and friends (Forbes et al., 2012) and the emotional support of their parents (McDonald-Harker et al., 2021). In contrast, seeking professional assistance is not common among young adults (only 5% mentioned that they started receiving psychological help from a professional as a result of the war). These findings may suggest the importance of involving family members, especially parents, in the effort to provide assistance to young adults.

The research found that only 26% of young adults expressed trust in the government. Moreover, 64% reported a decrease in their level of trust in the government following the war. Studies on the September 11 attacks in

the United States found that immediately after the terrorist attacks, there was a significant increase in trust in the government, which returned to normal levels after a few weeks (e.g., Perrin & Smolek, 2009). These studies also found that trust in the government is influenced by the government's performance during that period, the economy, media coverage, and personal experience (Perrin & Smolek, 2009), such as levels of anxiety, demographic characteristics, and social capital (civic engagement and trust in others) (Huddy et al., 2005). Anxiety, for example, heightens the sense of risk, leading citizens to shy away from military retaliation and to not support the government. On the other hand, when people perceive the danger as an external threat, support for the government's military actions and its policies to combat terrorism domestically and abroad increases. In the current study, 75% of young adults expressed trust in the IDF. Although this trust has eroded, as shown by surveys conducted monthly since the war's outbreak (e.g., by the Institute for National Security Studies – ISSN) and as indicated in this study (33% of young adults reported a decrease in their level of trust), it nonetheless remains high. This may be due to the significant role of the young adults themselves and their peers in the fighting.

The study also conducted a bivariate analysis (t test) to identify group differences. This analysis revealed a more complex picture. For example, it was found that young Arabs are particularly pessimistic and have fewer support resources than young 'Jews and others', and that their level of trust in public institutions is lower. In contrast, ultra-Orthodox young adults were found to be particularly optimistic, and their trust in public institutions was higher. This might be attributed to their religious faith, which is identified in the literature as a resilience factor or to the strong community ties within this group. However, it could also be due to their relatively lower direct exposure to the events of October 7 and to the war.

One of the main insights in the disaster literature is that disasters do not affect individuals and groups in the population to the same extent. Personal and social factors influence people's and communities' ability to cope with the effects of a disaster, recover from it, and return to normalcy (Neumayer & Plümper, 2007; Yuan et al., 2021). This claim was examined in this study using a multivariate analysis that explored the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and resilience factors using two dependent variables: deterioration in mental health and economic hardship (reduced ability to meet financial obligations). The models that examined the deterioration in mental health found that women, Arabs, young adults in non-marital relationships, and young adults with disability were more likely to experience a deterioration in their mental health compared to men, Jews, young adults without a partner, and young adults without disability. This may be due to these groups' lower access to resources for coping with the war's effects or feelings of insecurity. In contrast, it was found that ultra-Orthodox young adults and young adults living in the periphery were less affected by the war in this

regard. In the case of young adults in the periphery, it is possible that for those living in conflict areas, the reasons include poorer mental health even before the war and their adaptation to prolonged emergency situations. The data also show that knowing they have parents to rely on helps young adults cope mentally with the effects of the war. Surprisingly, it was found that professional support and general optimism were associated with a deterioration in mental health. The study's findings and the literature do not provide an explanation for this, and further research may be needed to understand these results. In the model that examined economic hardship, it was found that women, Arabs, parents of children, young adults living in the periphery, and young adults with below-average income were more likely to experience economic hardship. One of the interesting findings is that the strongest explanatory variable for economic hardship is employment termination due to the war, not only compared to those whose employment was not terminated but also those who were not employed before the war. The analysis also revealed that pessimism is linked to economic hardship, while having some support resources is associated with less economic hardship.

6.2 Recommendations

Young adults are a key part of the future of society and the driving force behind its economic growth. Over the past four years, they have faced two significant crises with wide-ranging impacts: the COVID-19 pandemic (see the table in Appendix B on the pandemic's effects on various aspects of their lives) and the Israel-Hamas War. For many months, they have shouldered the burden of defending the country based on a sense of duty, and have demonstrated great resilience. However, the cumulative impact of these events and the need to cope simultaneously with multiple challenges is wearing them down. The findings highlight the need for a comprehensive response that prioritizes the needs of young adults, will get them involved, and will provide solutions across various domains and of various types. To achieve this, a dedicated budget should be allocated to provide assistance that will improve the situation of young adults in the short and long terms and will expedite their recovery.

The research findings suggest several measures that should be adopted in order to help young adults cope with and recover from the effects of the war. First, it is crucial to make resources available to vulnerable groups such as women, Arabs, residents of the periphery, and young adults with disability. These resources could include both direct interventions to address symptoms of distress and information about existing resources that may provide assistance, such as after-school programs for children that can ease the burden on parents or youth centers offering relaxation and leisure activities. Second, given the higher likelihood of Arab youth reporting

a lack of support resources or a limited level of support and the impact this has on their mental health, it is important to find ways to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help and to make professional assistance more socially acceptable. Third, in light of the economic hardship experienced by young adults due to the war, it is essential to provide them with programs that teach financial literacy and proper economic management, as well as to identify opportunities for integration within the workforce. Fourth, many young adults were directly exposed to the events of October 7 and the war and, as a result, are suffering from trauma. It is important to identify and reach out to these young adults and connect them to services that can provide them with support in various ways, and which are tailored to their individual needs and circumstances. Fifth, many students in academia have missed months of study due to reserve military service; others have decided to take a break, and some have chosen to delay their studies or even their decision on whether to pursue higher education at all. These students and potential students will need both instrumental and emotional support in order for them to return to their studies, make up for lost time or integrate into the academic environment. Students from vulnerable groups will need this support even more to succeed. Finally, it is essential to remember that young adults have unique needs, as well as unique processes and opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to provide them with dedicated, tailored spaces where they can express themselves in the ways that they are most comfortable with and can develop their own ways to support their peers.

Other relevant publications of the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute

Ben Simon, B. & Tophork Bar, A. (2024). *Maturing in the shadow of war: The impact of crises and disasters on young adults – A literature review*. RR-997-24.

Konstantinov, V., Zohar, L., Toktali, R., Gilad, A. & Shorek, Y. (2021). *Young adults in Israel during the COVID-19 pandemic – Selected statistical data*. M-21-221.

These publications can be downloaded for free from the institute's website: brookdale.jdc.org.il

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Appendixes

Appendix A: Sociodemographic characteristics of young adults, by gender, population group, age, level of religiosity, peripherality index, and disability

Table A-1: Sociodemographic characteristics of young adults, by gender and population group (in percent)

Characteristic (N)	Total (701)	Gender		Population Group	
		Men (351)	Women (350)	Jews and others (508)	Arabs (193)
Gender	100	100	100	100	100
Men	50	-	-	50	51
Women	50	-	-	50	49
Age	100	100	100	100	100
18–24	43	43	43	41	47
25–29	29	29	29	29	29
30–34	28	28	28	30	24
Population group	100	100	100	100	100
Jews and others	72	72	72	100	-
Muslims (without Bedouins)	17	20	16	-	63
Bedouins	3	3	2	-	9
Christians	3	1	4	-	11
Druse	5	4	5	-	17
Country of origin	100	100*	100	100**	100
Israel	97	98	95	95	100
Other	3	2	5	5	-
Level of religiosity – Jews		100	100	100	
ultra-Orthodox	-	15	17	16	-
Religious	-	15	15	15	-
Traditional religious	-	11	13	12	-
Traditional – not very religious	-	26	21	23	-
Not religious, secular	-	33	34	34	-

Characteristic	Total	Gender		Population Group	
		Men	Women	Jews and others	Arabs
Level of religiosity – Arabs		100	100		100
Very religious	-	1	3	-	2
Religious	-	35	43	-	39
Not very religious	-	40	32	-	36
Not religious at all	-	24	22	-	23
Marital status	100	100**	100	100*	100
Single	46	54	38	43	53
Married	37	33	41	37	37
In a relationship	14	11	18	17	9
Separated	1	1	1	1	0.5
Divorced	2	1	2	2	0.5
Number of children	100	100*	100	100	100
None	74	79	69	73	77
One	10	9	11	9	10
Two	9	8	11	9	9
Three	4	3	5	5	2
Four or more	3	1	4	4	2
Age of children[^]	(181)	(73)	(108)	(139)	(42)
0–3	79	82	77	84**	64
3–6	48	47	49	51	38
6–9	22	24	18	20	29
9–12	8	6	9	6	12
12–15	2	-	4	2	2
15–18	1	-	1	-	2

Characteristic	Total	Gender		Population Group	
		Men	Women	Jews and others	Arabs
Highest educational certificate	100	100**	100	100**	100
Elementary/middle/high school without a diploma	2	4	1	3	2
High school diploma w/o matriculation	8	10	5	6	11
Matriculation	36	35	37	38	31
Post-secondary certificate	18	22	13	20	12
Bachelor's degree	29	24	34	24	39
Master's degree or higher	6	4	9	7	5
Other^^	1	1	1	2	-
Employment in the previous week	100	100**	100	100**	100
Employed	49	49	49	49	48
Military service (compulsory / professional)	5	9	1	6	2.6
Reserve duty	4	6	3	6	0.5
Studying	14	15	12	13	17
Working and studying	18	14	21	17	19
Not working or studying	10	7	14	9	13

^ The percentages do not add up to 100 since one respondent can have children of various ages

^^ Eight holders of other certificates: five with a vocational certificate; two yeshiva students and one with rabbinic certification

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01

Table A-2: Sociodemographic characteristics of the young adults, by age group (percent)

Characteristic	Total	24-18	29-25	34-30
(N)	(701)	(300)	(203)	(198)
Marital Status	100	100**	100	100
Single	46	68	33	27
Married	37	13	48	61
In a relationship / common law marriage	14	18	17	6
Separated	1	0.3	0.5	2
Divorced	2	0.7	1.5	4
Number of children	100	100**	100	100
None	74	94	75	43
One	10	4	8	19
Two	9	1	11	21
Three	4	0.7	3	10
Four or more	3	0.3	3	7
Age of children[^]	(181)	(17)	(52)	(112)
0-3	79	100**	89	71
3-6	48	12**	44	55
6-9	22	-	10**	30
9-12	8	-	2*	12
12-15	2	-	-	4
15-18	1	-	-	1
Highest educational certificate	100	100**	100	100
Elementary/middle/high school without a diploma	2	4	2	1
High school diploma w/o matriculation	8	10	5	7
Matriculation	36	55	28	16
Post-secondary certificate	18	17	17	18
Bachelor's degree	29	12	39	44
Master's degree or higher	6	1	8	13
Other	1	1	1	1

Characteristic	Total	24-18	29-25	34-30
Status in the previous week	100	100**	100	100
Employed	49	32	55	67
Military service (compulsory / professional)	5	11	1	1
Reserve duty	4	4	5	4
Studying	14	23	12	3
Working and studying	18	22	17	11
Not working or studying	10	8	10	14

^ The percentages do not add up to 100 since one respondent can have children of various ages

** p<0.01

Table A-3: Sociodemographic characteristics of young ultra-Orthodox and non-ultra-Orthodox Jews

Characteristic (N)	ultra-Orthodox (82)	Non-ultra-Orthodox (427)
Marital Status	100**	100
Single	29	46
Married	68	31
In a relationship / common law marriage	-	20
Separated	-	1
Divorced	3	2
Number of children	100**	100
None	46	78
One	11	9
Two	12	9
Three	15	3
Four or more	16	1
Highest educational certificate	100**	100
Elementary/middle/high school without a diploma	7	2
High school diploma w/o matriculation	12	6
Matriculation	15	42
Post-secondary certificate	41	16
Bachelor's degree	17	26
Master's degree or higher	3	7
Other	5	1
Status in the previous week	100*	100
Employed	57	48
Military service (compulsory / professional)	1	7
Reserve duty	3	6
Studying	18	12
Working and studying	15	17
Not working or studying	6	10

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01

Table A-4: Sociodemographic characteristics, by peripherality (percent)

Characteristic	1–4 Periphery (178)	5–7 Intermediate (273)	8–10 Center (230)
Population group	100**	100	100
Jews and others	49	77	90
Arabs	51	23	10
Marital Status	100*	100	100
Single	46	42	51
Married	38	41	30
In a relationship / common law marriage	15	14	16
Separated	-	1	-
Divorced	1	2	3
Number of children	100**	100	100
None	68	72	79
One	10	8	12
Two	14	10	5
Three	3	6	3
Four or more	5	4	1
Highest educational certificate	100	100	100
Elementary/middle/high school without a diploma	2	2	3
High school diploma w/o matriculation	12	7	5
Matriculation	38	32	36
Post-secondary certificate	14	20	18
Bachelor's degree	27	29	29
Master's degree or higher	5	7	7
Other	2	3	2
Status in the previous week	100*	100	100
Employed	44	51	50
Military service (compulsory / professional)	2	6	6
Reserve duty	3	4	6
Studying	17	12	15
Working and studying	18	19	15
Not working or studying	16	8	8

^ For 20 of the respondents (3%), their place of residence was not known

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01

Table A-5: Sociodemographic characteristics, by disability (percent)

Characteristic (N)	With a disability (55)	Without (634)
Population group	100*	100
Jews and others	64	74
Arabs	36	26
Marital Status	100	100
Single	44	46
Married	38	37
In a relationship / common law marriage	14	14
Separated	-	1
Divorced	4	2
Number of children	100	100
None	73	74
One	7	10
Two	14	9
Three	4	4
Four or more	2	3
Highest educational certificate	100	100
Elementary/middle/high school without a diploma	4	2
High school diploma w/o matriculation	9	7
Matriculation	46	36
Post-secondary certificate	11	18
Bachelor's degree	26	29
Master's degree or higher	4	7
Other	-	1
Status in the previous week	100	100
Employed	38	50
Military service (compulsory / professional)	2	6
Reserve duty	3	5
Studying	15	13
Working and studying	27	17
Not working or studying	15	9

^ There was no information on disabilities for 12 of the respondents (2%)

* $p < 0.05$

Note: There were no statistically significant differences between "highest certificate achieved" and "status during the past week" due to the small number of observations for young adults with a disability

Appendix B: Young adults in Israel during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Iron Swords War

Two major crises have occurred during the past four years, one global and the other local: in 2020–21, it was the COVID-19 pandemic and the changes it brought about in many facets of life worldwide; in 2023–2024, it was the Israel-Hamas War in Israel, which followed an unprecedented terrorist attack.

These two events are classified as disasters, one a natural disaster and the other manmade. However, there are differences between them, particularly in the context of young adults. While the COVID-19 pandemic primarily affected the elderly population and was characterized by restrictions on movement and social distancing, many of the victims of the Israel-Hamas War were from the young population, and the collective trauma accompanying this period was one of its most prominent features.

Despite the differences between the two disasters, both had a wide-ranging impact on young adults' lives, leading to a decision to compare data from surveys conducted during each of the periods. Data from the current survey during the Israel-Hamas War were compared to data from two surveys conducted by the Youth Authority in the Ministry of the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic: the first conducted in July 2020 (during the first lockdown), and the second in January–February 2021 (during the third lockdown). The Youth Authority surveys were conducted among young adults aged 18–35 and were not based on a random sample of young adults but rather a sample of convenience. The data are presented in Table B-1. Due to differences in the samples used in each of the surveys and in the data collection methods, the results of the comparison should be interpreted with caution.

The data reveal the challenges faced by young adults during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Israel-Hamas War. It appears that the COVID-19 pandemic affected young adults in the domain of employment. Thus, the percentage of non-working individuals was higher in the first survey (first lockdown) as compared to the second and the survey during the war, when the percentage of non-working individuals was similar. Meanwhile, the percentage of those who were laid off during the third lockdown and the percentage of young adults who started a new job were higher than during the period of the war. Accordingly, the economic impact was more severe during the pandemic than during the war: the percentage of those reporting an overdraft in their current checking account was twice as high during the pandemic (in both surveys) as compared to the situation prior to it, while during the war, the gaps between the pre-war and wartime periods were smaller. It was also found that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted young adults' sense of community, possibly due to the lockdowns. In contrast,

the war had a more pronounced impact on education: a higher percentage of young adults gave up on their studies, possibly due to the high number of those serving in the army and emotional difficulties, while during the COVID-19 pandemic, the transition to online learning allowed more young adults to pursue an education. Another area where the war's impact was evident is mental health: the percentage of young adults reporting a deterioration in their mental state was much higher during the war than in the second survey conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. In terms of community, although a higher percentage of young adults reported feeling part of their community both before and during the war, the percentage of young adults who attributed value to a sense of community was lower during the war than during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible that the lack of community during a period of restrictions on movement and congregating increased the value of community. Regarding the hierarchy of characteristics that make a workplace ideal, it appears that no significant changes occurred between the periods.

Table B-1: Comparison of the Corona surveys and the current survey (percent)

	COVID-19 pandemic		Israel-Hamas War
	First survey by the Youth Authority N=1,248	Second survey by the Youth Authority N=2,144	Brookdale Institute survey N=701
Studies			
How did the COVID-19 crisis affect your studies? / Did you plan to start studying this year but changed your plans due to the outbreak of the war?	60% continued studying as usual; 8% decided to take a break for one semester or the whole year; 3% decided to quit	71% continued studying as usual; 9% decided to take a break for one semester or the whole year; 3% decided to quit	23% gave up on studying during the year of the war
Employment			
Which of the following options best describes your employment status before the COVID-19 crisis / the war?	68% were employed; 5% were in regular military service; 20% were not working.		79% were employed; 7% were in compulsory military service; 14% were not working
Did you work during the COVID-19 crisis? / Did your job situation change with the outbreak of the war?	52% did not work; 25% continued as usual; 18% continued working with a change in workhours; 5% started a new job	28% did not work; 35% continued as usual; 19% continued working with a change in workhours; 18% started a new job	63% continued as usual; 34% continued working with a change in workhours; 3% started a new job
What were the circumstances of job termination (for those who worked before the crisis/ war but not during it)?	53% were furloughed (51% were eligible for unemployment benefits, and the rest were not); 17% were laid off; 9% went on paid leave	64% were furloughed (45% were eligible for unemployment benefits, and 19% were not); 35% were laid off (18% were eligible for unemployment benefits and 17% were not)	59% were furloughed (31% were eligible for unemployment benefits, and 28% were not); 14% were laid off (9% were eligible for unemployment benefits, and 5% were not); 7% went on paid leave

	COVID-19 pandemic		Israel-Hamas War
	First survey by the Youth Authority N=1,248	Second survey by the Youth Authority N=2,144	Brookdale Institute survey N=701
Characteristics of the ideal workplace	<p>Salary, benefits, and extended social conditions – 22%</p> <p>Flexible working hours, the possibility of working from home – 16%</p> <p>Opportunities for promotion at work – 10%</p> <p>A stable and secure workplace – 17%</p> <p>Training programs, education, and personal development – 7%</p> <p>Close to home – 7%</p> <p>Professional interest – 7%</p> <p>Organizational values that align with your own – 3%</p> <p>International opportunities – 2%</p> <p>An organization that employs the best workers – 1%</p> <p>The employment sector to which the organization belongs – 1%</p> <p>An organization with a reputation and prestige – 1%</p> <p>An organization with a social orientation – 4%</p>	<p>Salary, benefits, and extended social conditions – 22%</p> <p>Flexible working hours, the possibility of working from home – 14%</p> <p>Opportunities for promotion at work – 10%</p> <p>A stable and secure workplace – 14%</p> <p>Training programs, education, and personal development – 8%</p> <p>Proximity to home – 6%</p> <p>Professional interest – 10%</p> <p>Organizational values that align with your own – 4%</p> <p>International opportunities – 3%</p> <p>An organization that employs the best workers – 1%</p> <p>The employment sector to which the organization belongs – 1%</p> <p>An organization with a reputation and prestige – 1%</p> <p>An organization with a social orientation – 5%</p>	<p>Salary, benefits, and extended social conditions – 78%</p> <p>Flexible working hours, the possibility of working from home – 50%</p> <p>Opportunities for promotion at work – 44%</p> <p>A stable and secure workplace – 32%</p> <p>Training programs, education, and personal development – 16%</p> <p>Proximity to home – 13%</p> <p>Professional interest – 11%</p> <p>Organizational values that align with your own – 10%</p> <p>International opportunities – 7%</p> <p>An organization that employs the best workers – 5%</p> <p>The employment sector to which the organization belongs – 4%</p> <p>An organization with a reputation and prestige – 4%</p> <p>An organization with a social orientation – 3%</p> <p>A workplace distant from low-security areas – 4%</p>

	COVID-19 pandemic		Israel-Hamas War
	First survey by the Youth Authority N=1,248	Second survey by the Youth Authority N=2,144	Brookdale Institute survey N=701
Economic situation			
Current checking account status before the COVID-19 crisis/war	70% had a positive balance, 13% had a negative balance, 17% refused to answer	77% had a positive balance, 9% had a negative balance, 14% refused to answer	77% had a positive balance, 23% had a negative balance (among those who answered; 6% refused to answer)
Current checking account status during the crisis	52% had a positive balance, 29% had a negative balance, 19% refused to answer	65% had a positive balance, 20% had a negative balance, 15% refused to answer	67% had a positive balance, and 33% had a negative balance (among those who answered; 6% refused to answer)
In your opinion, how has the situation affected your ability to meet financial obligations (rent, bills, car payments, etc.)?	For 30%, the ability did not change; for 39%, the ability slightly decreased; for 29%, the ability significantly decreased; and for 2%, it improved	For 40%, the ability did not change; for 33%, the ability slightly decreased; for 23%, the ability significantly decreased; and for 5%, it improved	For 45%, the ability remained unchanged; for 36%, the ability slightly decreased; for 17%, the ability significantly decreased; and for 2%, it improved
Sense of community			
Before the crisis/war, I felt part of the community where I live	45%	45%	52%
Following the crisis/war, I felt part of the community where I live	36%	36%	53%
I attribute value to a feeling of community		80% agree or strongly agree	64% agree or strongly agree

	COVID-19 pandemic		Israel-Hamas War
	First survey by the Youth Authority N=1,248	Second survey by the Youth Authority N=2,144	Brookdale Institute survey N=701
Mental state			
Did the COVID-19 crisis negatively affect your mental state? / Has your mental state changed as a result of the war?	Not asked	29% reported that the COVID-19 crisis negatively affected their mental state to a large or very large extent	50% reported that the war worsened their mental state
Did you feel the need for professional mental health support as a result of the crisis?		51% did not feel the need for support; 26% wanted support but did not actually seek it; 26% began receiving support due to the crisis; 11% were already receiving support before the crisis	59% did not feel the need for support; 30% wanted support but did not actually seek it; 5% began receiving support due to the crisis; 6% were already receiving support before the crisis